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CASE COMMENTS
SECTION 1985(2) CLAUSE ONE DOES NOT REQUIRE ALLEGATIONS OF
CLASS- OR RACE-BASED DISCRIMINATORY ANIMUS
Kush v. Rutledge, 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983)
In Kush v. Rutledge,' the United States Supreme Court held that a
prospective plaintiff need not allege a class- or race-based discrimina-
tory animus2 in order to maintain a private cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(2) clause 1.3
1, 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983).
2. Animus is defined as "[mlind; soul; intention; disposition; design; will; that which informs
the body. Animo (q.v.) with the intention or design. These terms are derived from the civil law."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 80 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1976) provides:
(2) Obstructing Justice; intimidating party, witness or juror.
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimida-
tion, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such
court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to
injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so at-
tended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or
petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account
of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or
having been such ajuror, or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding,
hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course ofjustice in any State
or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equalprotection of the law, or to injure
him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any
person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;....
Id (emphasis supplied).
The provisions of this section have been informally divided into two clauses: "section 2 clause
1" refers to the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) prior to the first semicolon; "section 2 clause 2" refers to
that part of the statute which follows the semicolon. This division first occurred in Kelly v. Fore-
man, 384 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D. Tex. 1974), in which the district court concluded that no class- or
race-based discriminatory animus need be proven to state a cause of action under section 2 clause
1. By dividing § 1985(2) into two clauses, the court rejected the proposition advanced by Profes-
sor Antieau that this section be divided into three subsections. See C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS AcTs § 95 (1971). Judge Singleton reasoned that by dividing § 1985(2) into two clauses,
the statute becomes more understandable. 384 F. Supp. at 1354. While both clauses begin with
the language "if two or more persons conspire," the first clause concerns only conspiracies and
does not contain equal protection language, embodied solely in the second clause. Id Judge Sin-
gleton concluded that "[lt is logical to assume that Congress intended the language of § 1985(2)
before the semicolon to protect specific activities vital to the functioning of courts of the United
States, without requiring any allegation or proof of invidious discrimination." Id at 355. See also
Comment, 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(2) Part One: The Inapplicability of the Animus Requirement
from Griffin v. Breckenridge, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 168, 180-81 (1982) (recommending that Grijn's
animus requirement for § 1985(3) not be applied to § 1985(2) clause 1) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Inapplicability of Animus Requirement].
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Respondent, a white football player at Arizona State University,
claimed that the athletic director, head coach and assistant coach con-
spired to threaten and hinder potential witnesses from testifying at the
respondent's trial in federal court.4  The district court dismissed re-
spondent's claim for failure to allege a violation of his civil rights.' The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 6 concluding that a claim of
witness intimidation founded on section 1985(2) clause 1 need not be
supported by a class- or race-based discriminatory animus.7 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,' affirmed the Ninth
Circuit and held: no allegation of class- or race-based animus need be
alleged to sustain a cause of action under section 1985(2) clause 1.1
Congress designed section 1985(2) clause 1 to prevent conspiracies
that deter individuals from gaining access to or testifying in federal
court' ° and to prevent conspiracies that influence grand or petit ju-
rors. " Congress originally enacted section 1985(2) clause 1 in section 2
4. 103 S. Ct. 1483, 1485 (1983). Rutledge alleged in addition a number of common-law and
statutory claims against the University and individual defendants arising out of incidents that
occurred while respondent was a member of the Arizona State University football team. Id
5. Id at 1484. The district court held that respondent failed to state a claim under § 1985
because he did not show that he was a member of an identifiable class, and because his allegations
of a conspiracy were not supported by specific facts. Id The district court also held that respon-
dent's action was barred by the eleventh amendment. Id
6. 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983).
7. Id at 1354.
8. 102 S. Ct. 3508 (1982).
9. 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983).
10. To sustain a cause of action under this section plaintiff, must allege and establish a nexus
between the conspiracy and a federal court. See Phillips v. Fisher, 445 F. Supp. 552 (D. Kan.
1977). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 451 (Supp. V 1981) (statutory definition of "court of the United States").
For cases illustrating conspiracies that denied plaintiffs access to the courts or wrongfully influ-
enced witnesses, see, e.g., Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1110 (1981) (defendants retaliated against plaintiffs for filing suits in federal courts);
McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981) (conspiracy
denied plaintiff an opportunity to testify on his own behalf); Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629
F.2d 448, 450 (7th Cir. 1980) (conspiracy denied plaintiffs medical treatment due to filing of mal-
practice suits); Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497, 502 (10th Cir. 1979) (defendants conspired to deter
plaintiff from testifying truthfully and freely); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 832 (3rd Cir.
1976) (cooperating witness and prosecuting attorney conspired to introduce perjured testimony);
Hoopes v. Nacrelli, 512 F. Supp. 363, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (conspiracy to intimidate plaintiff and
keep him from testifying in previous criminal trial); People ex rel. Snead v. Kirkland, 462 F. Supp.
914, 917 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (conspiracy used perjured testimony to obtain indictment and conviction
of the plaintiffs); Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987, 997 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (conspiracy to bar plain-
tiffs from state courts); Crawford v. City of Houston, 386 F. Supp. 187, 189 (S.D. Tex. 1974)
(defendants retaliated against plaintiff because of latter's testimony in court).
11. See, e.g., Bergman v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Jones v. United States, 401
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Number 3] SECTION 1985(2) CLAUSE ONE
of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act ("Klan Act").'2 The Klan Act, although
motivated primarily by political considerations, 13 was an attempt by
the Republican congressional majority to improve the plight of recently
emancipated southern blacks' 4 amid reports of growing racial and
political unrest in the South. 5
F. Supp. 168 (E.D. Ark. 1975), afl'd, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977).
12. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,
1986 (Supp. V 1981)). As originally enacted, section 2 of the Klan Act states:
That if two or more persons within any State or Territory of the United States shall
conspire together. . .[to threaten] to deter anyparty or witness in any court ofthe United
States from attending such court, or from tesqfying in any matter pending in such court
fully freely, and truthfully, or to injure any such party or witness in hisperson orproperty on
account of his having so attended or testqfed or byforce, intimidation, or threat to influence
the verdict, presentment, or indictment, or anY juror or grand juror in any court of the
United States, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict,
presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or on account of being or having
been such juror. . . and every person so offending ... shall be punished by a fine not
less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment, with or
without hard labor, as the court may determine, for a period of not less than six months
nor more than six years, as the court may determine, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment as the court shall determine. And if any one or more persons engaged in any such
conspiracy shall do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby any person shall be injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the person
so injured or deprived of such rights and privileges may have and maintain an action for
the recovery of damages so occasioned by such injury or deprivation of rights and privi-
leges, against any one or more of the persons engaged in such conspiracy, such action to
be prosecuted in the proper district or Circuit Court of the United States.
Id (emphasis added).
13. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1871) [hereinafter cited as 1871 DEBATES].
Speeches during the debates reflected a growing concern among Northern Republicans that their
newly constructed governments in the South were being dismantled. See, e.g., id
Republican congressional sentiment was almost unanimous in regarding the Klan as a political
force. Id at 504 (Klan organized "to punish men for their political opinions.") (statement of Sen.
Pratt (R. Ind.)); id. at 108 app. (Klan constituted "a Democratic organization, in the interests of
the Democratic Party.") (statement of Sen. Poole (R.N.C.)); id. at 196 app. (objective of the Klan
included the defeat of Republiciamsm) (statement of Rep. Snyder (R. Ark.)).
14. See, e.g., 1871 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 334-35 (remarks of Congressman Hoar).
15. In response to President Grant's call for immediate legislative action to combat these
conditions, id at 326, the House Judiciary Committee drafted a bill in five days protecting all
federal statutory and fourteenth amendment rights. Id at 317. The bill contained four sections
that empowered all branches of the federal government to enforce the fourteenth amendment in
areas where state government officials were either ineffective or unwilling. Id See generally
Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Relected Light on State Action and the Fourteenth
.4mendment, I 1 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331 (1967) (analyzing the Klan Act debates and their impact on
congressional power to punish individuals); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of
"'Equal Protection of the Laws" 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 421 (1973) (discussing history of the equal
protection laws); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv.
1323 (1952) (lamenting federal enforcement of individual constitutional rights in light of legisla-
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Although the Klan Act congressional debates examined the clandes-
tine activities of the Ku Klux Klan and its lasting effect on the South, 6
a considerable portion of the debates focused on Congress' power to
intrude in the affairs of individual states. 7 Congressman Shellabarger,
the bill's sponsor, argued that the fourteenth amendment gave the Fed-
eral Government the power to protect its citizens in the enjoyment of
their federal rights against the attacks of private individuals.' 8
Other Congressmen vehemently disagreed with this position. They
argued that Congress lacked constitutional authority to extend federal
jurisdiction to punish offenses traditionally reserved to state law.' 9 As
tive history); Note,.A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its OriginalPurpose, 46 U. C11l. L.
REv. 402 (1979) (in-depth analysis of the legislative history of section 1985(3)).
16. See, e.g., 1871 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 517 (speech of Congressman Shellabarger).
Predictably, the Republicans denounced the politically inspired violence in the South and de-
manded federal action to ameliorate the dangerous conditions. See, e.g., id at 394 (statement of
Rep. Rainey (R.S.C.)); id at 437 (statement of Rep. Cobb (R.N.C.)). See generally 1871 DEBATES,
supra note 13.
Democratic members of Congress, characterizing reports of outrageous Klan activity as ex-
tremely exaggerated, see id at 330-31 app. (statement of Rep. Morgan (D. Ohio)); id at 17-19 app.
(statement of Rep. Bayard (D. Del.)); id at 139-40 (statement of Rep. Vaughn (D. Tenn.)), justi-
fied the Klan activities as a natural reaction to the poorly administered and corrupt Republican
government of the post-Civil War era. See id at 422 (statement of Representative Winchester (D.
Ky.)); id at 433 (statement of Representative Cox (D. Ohio)).
17. As originally introduced, § 2 of the Klan Act provided in part that "perjury, subornation
of perjury, [and] criminal obstruction of legal process" would be considered felonies. Id The
constitutionality of the proposed § 2 was the subject of extensive debate. See infra notes 18-20 and
accompanying text.
18. Justifying the expansion of congressional power, the Congressman declared:
If, after all this transcendent profusion of enactment in restraint of the States and affirm-
ative conferment of power on Congress, the States still remain unrestrained, the com-
plete, sole arbiters of power, to defend or deny national citizenship to make laws
abridging or not abridging, to protect or to destroy, by landed murder, these United
States citizens, must stand by a powerless spectator of the overthrow of the rights and
liberties of its citizens, then not only is the profusion of guards put by the fourteenth
amendment around our rights a miserable waste of words, but the Government is itself a
miserable sham, its citizenship a curse, and the Union not fit to be.
Id at 69.
19. 1871 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 336, 337. Congressman Blanchard (R. Ill.) stated:
This section [Two] has had different interpretations. If it intends and must be construed
to give the Federal Courts jurisdiction to punish combinations or conspiracies to commit
murder, mayhem, assault and battery within a state, I can find in the Constitution no
warrant for the exercise of such authority. If Congress can provide for the punishment
of the offenses themselves, it has this jurisdiction, a revolution in the whole theory of our
government has been affected unknown to the people.
Id at 313. See also McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Congressman Moore of Illinois succinctly stated this position: "[Tlhe second section, in my
opinion, contains provisions which, I fear, cannot be defended, and which override, as I am com-
pelled to think, the vested rights of the States." Id at 112 app. See Note, supra note 13, at 411-17.
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a result of these debates, Representatives Cook and Willard amended
Shellabarger's draft by adding equal protection language to the clauses
that had the greatest potential for infringing upon states' rights in hopes
of assuring their constitutionality.2"
In its final form, the Klan Act contained sections providing the fed-
eral government and private individuals with the ability to redress po-
litically inspired conspiracies, violence and discriminatory activities
that denied persons their federal civil rights.2" Specifically, section 2 of
the Klan Act provided a cause of action for individuals denied certain
federal rights by conspiratorial public officials or private parties.22
In 1875, Congress revised the Klan Act; section 2 as amended sur-
vives unchanged as the present section 1985.23 In its revised form, sec-
tion 1985 contains three subsections. 24  Section 1985(1) provides
sanctions against conspiracies that prevent federal officers from per-
forming their duties.25 Section 1985(2), divided into two clauses, 26 pre-
vents the obstruction of justice and protects an individual's right to
equal protection of the laws.27 Section 1985(3) provides a cause of ac-
tion for individuals against conspiracies that deprive them of equal
protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under law.28
20. 1871 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 485-86 (remarks of Representative Cook (R. I11.)). See
Comment, Inapplicability of.4nimus Requirement, supra note 3, at 173-74.
21. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 1, 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976)).
22. See supra note 12.
23. Pursuant to the authority in 14 Stat. 74 (1866), Congress authorized the revision of the
Klan Act, as well as the other revised statutes. Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 333, §§ 2-5, 18 Stat. 113.
See Comment, Inapplicability of Animus Requirement, supra note 3, at 177 n.52.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976). See infra note 25 for text of§ 1985(1); see supra note 3 for
text of § 1985(2); see infra note 28 for text of § 1985(3).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) (1976) states:
(1) Preventing officer from performing duties.
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force, intimi-
dation or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confi-
dence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; or to induce by
hke means any officer of the United States to leave any State, district, or place, where his
duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or prop-
erty on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the
lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or
impede him in the discharge of his official duties.
26. See supra note 3.
27. Id
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976) states the following:
(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges.
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equalprotection ofthe laws, or of equal
Number 31
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Unlike section 1985(2) clause 2 and section 1985(3), which contain
equal protection language, section 1985(2) clause 1 does not contain
such language.2 9 The Supreme Court addressed the semantic disparity
among the clauses in Griffin v. Breckenridge.30 In Griffin, the black
plaintiffs alleged that the white defendants conspired to block their au-
tomobile from passing on a public highway, mistakenly believing them
to be civil rights workers.31 The Court held that section 1985(3) ap-
plied to private conspiracies that interfered with the rights of national
citizenship.32 It limited the application of section 1985(3), however, to
conspiracies motivated by a race- or class-based "invidiously discrimi-
natory animus. '33 The Court required discriminatory animus to avoid
an interpretation broadening the statute into a general federal tort
law.34  By avoiding federalism issues, however, the Court failed to
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering
the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such State or Territory the equalprotection of the laws; or if two or more persons
conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled
to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the
election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or
as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or
property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in
this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy whereby, another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
29. See supra note 3.
30. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
31. Id. at 90-91.
32. Id at 92.
33. Id at 102. Justice Stewart stated that "the conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a
deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all." Id To come within the
ambit of the section 1985(3) equal protection clause "the complaint must allege that defendants
did:
(1) conspire to go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another.
(2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.
(3) that the conspirators did, or caused to be done any act in furtherance of the object of [the]
conspiracy, whereby another was
(4a) injured in his person or property or
(4b) deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
Id at 102-03.
34. Id at 102. The Court stressed that constitutional barriers existed that precluded an inter-
pretation of§ 1985(3) as a general federal tort law. Id See Note, supra note 15, at 429-32. These
barriers, which original drafters of the Klan Act also considered, stemmed from the federal-state
balance envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. See Note, supra note 15, at 423 n.141. In
order to effect congressional intent and to avoid the federalism issue, the Court determined that a
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clearly indicate whether the equal protection limitation of section
1985(3) applied to the entire statute.35
The Griffin Court's equivocal application of the equal protection lim-
itation caused a split among the circuit courts. Some circuit courts held
that Congress based section 1985 on the fourteenth amendment and
therefore the equal protection language applies to all sections.36 Other
circuit courts, however, contended that the legislative history of section
1985(2) clause 1 illustrated Congress' concern with the power of the
federal courts, and consequently do not import equal protection lan-
guage to clause 1.37
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits follow the interpretation that places an
equal protection limitation on section 1985.38 The Fifth Circuit's en
bane decision in Kimble v. DJ McDuffy, Inc. , ably illustrates the ra-
tionale for this approach.' In Kimble, the court held that the Griffin
plaintiff must allege discrimination as the result of a class or racially motivated conspiracy to
bring suit under § 1985(3). 403 U.S. at 102.
See generally Wildman, 42 US. C. § 1985(3)-4 Private Act to Vindicate Fourteenth Amendment
Rights: A Paradox Resolved, 17 SAN DIEGo L. Rav. 317 (1980) (clarifying how one analyzes
section 1985(3) as against conspirators who deny an individual equal protection under the four-
teenth amendment); Note, The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): .4 Sug-
gestedApproach, 64 MINN. L. REv. 63 (1980) (examines the Grffin animus requirement as applied
subsequent to that case); Note, supra note 15 (analyzing the legislative history of 1985(3)).
35. Some of the language in Grgin indicates that the limitation could apply to the entire
statute. The Court's extensive examination of the Klan Act's legislative history suggests that any
limitations found in 1985(3) could be applied to the entire statute. See, e.g., Kimble v. D.J.
McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 346-47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110 (1981) (Grfflin analysis
of section 2 of the 1871 Klan Act applies to all of§ 1985).
36. See, eg., Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1110 (1981); Jones v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 168, 173 (E.D. Ark. 1975), af'd, 536 F.2d 269
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Davis v. Sprouse, 405 F. Supp. 45, 47-48 (E.D.
Va. 1975); McIntosh v. Garofalo, 367 F. Supp. 501,505 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Phillips v. Singletary, 350
F. Supp. 297, 302 (D.S.C. 1972). See also infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
38. See Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110
(1981); Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1977).
39. 648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110 (1981).
A panel of the Fifth Circuit originally held that § 1985(2) clause 1 did not require a showing of
class- or race-based animus. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 623 F.2d 1060, 1068 (5th Cir. 1980),
rev'd, 648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The Fifth Circuit en banc reversed the panel hold-
ing, dividing twelve to eleven in the question of an animus requirement. 648 F.2d at 348, 349.
40. The Eighth Circuit adopted the same interpretation in Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d
269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1977). In Jones, the plaintiff accused the United
States Attorney and his assistants of conspiring to influence a juror in his aborted criminal trial for
tax evasion and perjury. 401 F. Supp. 168, 169 (E.D. Ark. 1965), a#d, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1977). The district court carefully analyzed the legislative history of the
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class-based animus requirement directly applies to any action brought
pursuant to section 1985(2). 4 1 In a divided opinion,42 the circuit court
examined the legislative history of the Klan Act and the reasoning of
the Groin decision.43 The Kimble majority emphasized that Grin re-
quired invidiously discriminatory class-based animus to avoid trans-
forming section 1985(3) into a general federal tort law.44 Following the
GroIFn rationale, the court concluded that Congress did not design sec-
tion 1985(2) as a general federal tort law45 and, therefore, any action
brought under this section must be motivated by some class-based, in-
vidiously discriminatory animus.4 6
The Third,47 Seventh,48 Ninth49 and District of Columbia Circuits5"
Klan Act and the impact of the Grfin decision. Id at 173-74. The district court read section
1985(2) in light of section 1985(3) and determined that the judicial interpretation of subsection 3
applied directly to subsection 2, thereby requiring a racial- or class-based animus for each section.
Id at 174. Because the plaintiff failed to allege any racial- or class-based animus, the district
court dismissed the claim for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.
Id The Eighth Circuit summarily affirmed the district court on this issue. 536 F.2d at 271.
41. 648 F.2d at 348. In Kimble, the plaintiffs, oil rig workers, alleged that their former em-
ployers conspired with each other to deny them employment after they filed personal injury or
workers' compensation claims against two former employers. Id at 342.
42. Id at 349. The Fifth Circuit en banc divided twelve to eleven on the question of an
animus requirement. See supra note 39. The dissent concluded that the absence of equal protec-
tion language in section 1985(2) clause 1, as well as its apparent purpose--to uphold the integrity
of the federal court system-failed to warrant the imposition of any equal protection limitation
not found in the language of the statute. Id at 350.
43. Id at 344-45. See supra notes 12-20 & 30-34.
44. Id at 345-48.
45. Id at 348. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that:
[g]iven the background of violence and direct intimidation prevalent at the time of the
original passage of Section 1985(2), it would be anomalous to find, without any specific
support in the legislative history, that Congress intended to create a federal tort remedy
for an employer's economic use of public information relating to the filing of federal
lawsuits. Section 1985(2) was not designed as a vehicle to remedy such allegedly tortious
acts of employers against employees pursuing workmen's compensation or personal in-
jury claims. Rather, it was intended to protect against direct violations of a party or
witness's right to attend or testify in federal court.
Id
46. Id at 348. The circuit court affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for
summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to allege an injury for "having attended or testified
in a court of the United States in violation of section 1985(2)." Id
47. Brewer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976).
48. Stem v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975
(1977). In Stern, the Seventh Circuit was asked to import the equal protection requirements of
§ 1985(3) into a cause of action founded on § 1985(1). This contention was based in part on the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 904 (1977), which held that the equal protection language in § 1985(3) applied to § 1985(2)
actions. See supra notes 38-41. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, finding Jones unper-
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adopted a much broader interpretation of section 1985(2) clause L"
These courts held that the section 1985(3) class-based animus limita-
tion does not apply to the other subsections of the provision.
The Third Circuit originally developed this interpretation in Brawer
v. Horowitz. z Examining the language of section 1985(2) in light of its
legislative history, the court divided section 1985(2) into two clauses,5 3
and held that each clause protects different rights.54 The court reasoned
that because the second clause contains equal protection language, it
only applies to conspiracies to deny equal protection of the laws.
Consequently, any action based on clause 2 must be predicated on a
race- or class-based discriminatory animus.56 The first clause, however,
lacks similar equal protection language.57 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that Congress intended the first clause to guard against conspir-
acies which directly affect the federal judicial process. 58 While this
type of conspiracy must have a distinct federal nexus, it does not re-
quire as a predicate act an allegation of class- or race-based discrimina-
tory animus.5 9
suasive, and noted in passing that "the first portion of § 1985(2) aims at protecting the sanctity of
federal court proceedings and could be sustained without reference to the Reconstruction Amend-
ments," 547 F.2d at 1341 n.18.
49. Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981), affdsub norm. Kush
v. Rutledge, 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983).
50. McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606 (D.C.Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981).
51. See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasoning used by
these courts.
52. 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976). The plaintiffs, convicted in federal court of conspiring to
transport and transporting stolen United States Treasury bills, alleged that the prosecuting attor-
ney and cooperating witnesses conspired to use perjured testimony against them. Id at 832.
53. Id at 840. The court relied on Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461 (Ist Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 904 (1976), to support this division. The First Circuit in Hahn characterized the first
clause as addressing "conspiracies to interfere with parties, jurors, or witnesses in federal courts."
Id at 469. Section 1985(2) clause 2 was at issue in Hahn, and therefore the court did not discuss
whether to infer any race- or class-based discriminatory animus requirement in clause 1.
54. 535 F.2d at 840.
55. Id The court determined that the second clause of section 1985(2) "guards against those
obstructions of justice 'in any State or Territory' which have as their objects the denial of equal
protection of the laws." Id
56. Id
57. Id The omission of the equal protection language in the first clause constituted not a
substantive change, but rather an attempt to clarify congressional intent to prevent conspiracies
that interfere with the judicial process.
58. Because the plaintiff alleged that the prosecutor and the cooperating witness merely influ-
enced the jurors, the court held that he failed to state a cause of action under the statute. The
court "deem[ed] this influence to be too remote to fit within the intended ambit of § 1985(2)." Id
59. Id The District of Columbia Circuit used reasoning similar to Brawer in McCord v.
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InKush v. Rutledge, 60 the United States Supreme Court resolved this
conflict among the circuits by holding that section 1985(2) clause 1 does
not require a discriminatory animus in order to maintain a cause of
action. The Court rejected the Fifth and Eighth Circuits' interpretation
of the statute and refused to apply the reasoning of Griin v. Brecken-
ridge6" to section 1985(2) clause 1.62 Adopting the reasoning of the
majority of the circuits,63 Justice Stevens stated three bases for the
Court's holding. First, in deciding Grifn the Court only considered
the equal protection question in the context of section 1985(3).64 Sec-
ond, the framers of the Klan Act added equal protection language to
sections 1985(2) clause 2 and 1985(3) because the lack of such language
would have caused a constitutionally impermissible invasion of the
states' rights.65 Third, and most important, the plain language of sec-
tion 1985(2) clause 1 contains no equal protection language upon which
Bailey, 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983 (1981). It found that "the first
clause, unlike its companion provisions, prohibits conspiracies to interfere with the integrity of the
federal judicial system. It does not demand a denial of 'equal protection of the laws,' nor is an
implication of such a requirement necessary to avoid constitutional shoals." Id at 614. Writing
for the court, Judge Tamm summarized the constitutional bases for these clauses in a footnote:
The constitutional basis for the first clause of § 1985(2) is Congress's plenary power
over the federal courts .... Congress lacked an equivalent authority over state courts,
so the equal protection language in the second half of § 1985(2) was inserted to ground
that portion of the statute on Congress's power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
Id at 614, n.12.
60. 103 S. Ct. 1483, 1484 (1983).
61. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
62. 103 S. Ct. 1483, 1484 (1983).
63. Id See supra notes 47-54.
64. The Griffin Court invoked an invidiously discriminatory animus requirement for
§ 1985(3) for fear that without such a requirement it might become a general federal tort law. See
supra note 33 and accompanying text. The defendants in Kush argued that the Court must apply
the Griffin animus requirement to section 1985(2) clause 1, to avoid similar abuse of this section as
a general federal tort law. 103 S. Ct. 1483, 1487-88 (1983). The defendant relied on Kimble v.
D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 348 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Seesupra notes 36-45 and accom-
panying text.
65. 103 S. Ct. 1483, 1487 (1983). As read by Justice Stevens, the legislative history indicated
that Congress enacted the Klan Act to protect the integrity of the federal judicial system and
stabilize the post-Civil War South. Id at 1487. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
The original title of the Act indicated that Congress did not intend the statute to be limited solely
to the enforcement of rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Congress originally enti-
tled the Klan Act "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States, andfor Other Purposes." Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13
(1971) (current version of§ 2 of the Klan Act of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1976)) (emphasis
supplied). This title indicates that the drafters of the Klan Act intended it to protect all federal
statutory and fourteenth amendment rights. See supra note 16.
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to engraft an invidiously discriminatory animus. 6 6
By refusing to adopt an interpretation of section 1985(2) clause 1
which rigidly required a showing of class- or race-based invidiously
discriminatory animus, the Supreme Court in Kush v. Rutledge67 as-
sured a future litigant's right of access to the federal judicial system.
The Supreme Court reached this conclusion by respecting the legisla-
tive history of the statute, according the plain language of the statute its
due weight, and adopting a broad interpretation of that language to
fully effectuate the intent of Congress.
A.B.A.
66. 103 S. Ct. 1483, 1488 (1983). Justice Stevens noted that the 1875 revision of the Klan Act
clarified its meaning, making it unlikely that the lack of equal protection language in section
1985(2) clause 1 resulted from a drafting oversight. 103 S. Ct. at 1487 n.6. Presumably the Re-
publican dominated Congress would have opposed any subsequent revisions in the Klan Act
which might have altered the Act's ability to protect the federal judiciary or slowed the reconstruc-
tion of the south. See supra notes I 1 & 14-15 and accompanying text.
67. 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983).
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